Lightner v. Craven Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 41561 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
1-21-2014
Lightner v. Craven Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41561
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Lightner v. Craven Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41561" (2014). Not Reported. 1695.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1695
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 




OLIVIA CRAVEN Executive Director of 
Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole 
MIKE H. MA THEWS, JANIE DRESSEN, 
ROBIN SANDY, BUD BRINEGER, 
DEL RAY HOLM, Commissioners of Idaho 
Commissions of Pardons and Parole and 

















CASE NO. 41561 
DCT NO. CV OC-2013 17033 (ADA) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF WITH 
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS 
JAN 2 1 2UFt ;, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial Distract of the 
State of Idaho, in and/or the Cou11ty of Ada 
HONORABLE JUDGE DANIEL HURLBUTT 
District Judge 
WlLLIAM LIGHTNER #41438 
APPELLANT 
ICC, UNIT P-21-B 
P.O. BOX 70010 
BOISE, IDAHO 83707 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CIVIL DIVISION, APPELLATE UNIT 
POBOX87320 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
KARIN MAGNELLI ISB 8929 
Deputy Attorney General 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ......................................................... 3 
INTRODlJCTION ..................................................•...........................•........ 4 
STA. TEMENT OF FACTS ...•...............•........•...............•.......•..•..........•....•...... 5 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAI ................................................................... 6 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE ONE ..•.• * •••••••••••••• § •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• a •••••••••••••• 7-8 
ISSUE TW0 ............................ ~···························*·········*····················9 
ISSUE THREE ............................. * •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• * ••••••• 10 
ISSUE FOUR ..............................•..............•........•........•.••.•........... 11-12 
CONCLUSION ••.................•..•.............................•.........•............•........... 13-14 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM LIGHTNER ...................................................... 15-16 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARCIA LIGHTNER••••••••••••••••••u••• .... ••••••••••••• .. H•a•• .. •••••17-18 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...•........•...........................•............. * ••••••••••••••••• 19 
APPELLANTS BRIEF WITH SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS Page 2 
IRCP 40( d)( I) 
IRCP 40 (d)(l)<h) 
IC 20-228 
IRCP 12(b)(6) 
IRCP 56 (c) 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Gibson v. United States 781 F2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986) 
Miles v. Idaho Power Co. 116 Idaho 635, 778 P2d 757 (1989) 
Jahnke v. Moore 112 Idaho 944, 737 P2d 465 (ct. App 1987) 
Osterloh v. State 100 Idaho 702. 604 P2d 716 (1978) 
APPELLANTS BRIEF WITH SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS Page 3 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant filed this civil Rights Complaint ( .. Complaint") on 26 September 2013 (dkt 11) 
requesting reimbursement of funds. These funds were coilected from him by the respondents for 
services rendered to be able to be on parole. This was not a one-time fee. but collected on a month to 
month basis. When Appellant was violated and returned to the prison. Respondents elected not to count 
any of Appellants time which he had successfully completed on parole. Instead. Respondents added his 
parole time to the end of his sentence, changing his final discharge date. Appellant is seeking 
reimbursement for the successful months completed on parole that he was charged for, yet now not 
accounted for in his time calculations. If Respondents are not counting the time, appellant claims that 
the services for credited parole were not rendered as per the agreement of parole. and reimbursement 
should be ma-de. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I . Appellant was originally paroled in January 2004. 
2. Allegations were made against AppelJant and he was returned to IDOC custody in August 
2004. 
3. At Appellants revocation hearing in March 2005 he was reinstated and remained in good 
standing until July 2005 when he violated his parole conditions. Appellant's violation was 
not related to any new crimes. 
4. Appellant was arrested and returned on a commission warrant to custody in October 2005 
5. Appellant received a revocation hearing in 2006 where his parole was terminated, and he is 
still currently confined under IDOC care, custody and control. 
6. Appellant was never informed by the Commissions of Pardons and Parole or IDOC staff that 
the money he paid for "services" could be refundable. 
7. Appellant filed this civil action on 26 September 2013 (dkt 11) after hearing for the first time 
that it could be possible to get a refund of the parole money he had previously paid. 
8. On 8 October 2013, Appellant filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Hurlbutt without cause (dkt 
27). 
9. On 11 October 2013 Counsel for Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss \vith a supporting 
Memorandum ( dkt 30). 
10. Prior to Appellant being afforded an opportunity to answer the Respondents Motion, the 
District Court granted Respondents Motion and dismissed the case on 15 October 2013 ( dkt 
40). 
11. Appellant now appeals the District Court rulings ( dkt 4 7). 





ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Did the statute ofiimitations begin at Appellants· 2006 revocation hearing. or at a 
later 2013 date? 
Knowing Appellant had filed a Motion to disqualify without cause under IRCP 40 
(d)(l) should district court Judge Hurlbutt have issued an order of dismissal of the 
case seven (7) days after receiving the Motion to disqualify without cause? 
Did the District Court abuse its discretion by granting Defendants/Respondents 
Motion to Dismiss prematurely without allowing Plaintiff/ Appellant a chance to 
respond? 
is the $600.00 collected from Appellant by the Respondents an issue of material 
fact for which relief can be granted? 
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ISSUE 1-
ARGUMENT 
Did the statute of limitations begin at Appellants' 2006 revocation hearing, or at 
a later 2013 date? 
Appellant was arrested by a commission warrant and returned to custody on 2 October 2005. At 
his 2006 revocation hearing Appellant was informed that in addition to being violated and returned to 
prison, that his completed parole time would be forfeited . 
.. The time ·which during such prisoner was on parole shall not be 
deemed a pan [of the sentence J thereof,: unless 1he commission, in its 
discretion, shall determine otherwise. but nothinK herein constrained shall 
prevent the commis.-don from again paroling such prisoners at its 
discretion··, IC 20-228. 
The issue presented by Appellant in his complaint was that of reimbursement of funds collected 
from him. NOT that his time was being forfeited (dkt 14). This is not addressed JC 20-228. These are 
two separate issues and need to be treated as such. It was clear to Appellant that his time was being 
forfeited. The issue of time forfeiture was discussed at the 2006 revocation hearing. However, the issue 
of financial refund for services not rendered was not addressed or discussed at that hearing. 
Under the ruics of the Court and pre established Jaw, the Appellants Statute of limitations begins 
to run once he knew of the injury and its cause. 
"[a] claim occurs when the plaintfff knows or has reason to know 
of the iJ?iury which is the basis.for the action" Gibson v. United States 781 
F2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986) 
Appellant claims that he did not know that there was a possibility of a refund. Also, he had no 
reason to even suspect to know, and was not informed at his 2006 hearing that the possibiiity of a refund 
was a genuine issue of material fact. Neither did he sign a form such is giYen in Miranda informing him 
of any rights. The issue of monetary refund or reimbursement was not mentioned. 
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Respondents claim that Appellant knew his time was being forfeited and automatically by 
assumption without proof or evidence lead the court to believe that these are one in the same (dkt 35), 
but forfeiture of time, and reimbursement of colJected fees are separate issues, and as such, can have 
different dates acquiring knowledge about them. Appellant admits he was infonned at his 2006 hearing 
that his time was being forfeited. But as an inmate, locked away in prison without access to an attorney 
he was not informed and did not have any knowledge of the possibility of a reimbursement until 2013. 
No evidence has been given by defendants to prove otherwise. 
Furthermore, the non moving party is entitled to have all information and inferences from the 
record viewed in his favor. ltliies v. Idaho Power Co. 116 Idaho 635 728 P2d 757 (1989). Since 
respondents have provided nothing more than mere speculation and assumption that Appellant knew and 
was aware of his refund issue without proof, it must be viewed in his favor that he did not know. 
Therefore, 2006 cannot be used as a starting accrual date for purpose of statute of limitations. 
Meanwhile, Appellanf s claims are supported with an affidavit of his own, and that of another 
who attended the 2006 hearing. These affidavits prove the genuine issue of material fact in question 
concerning reimbursement of fees was not mentioned. Defendants/Respondents motion to dismiss is 
based on un-supported and unsubstantiated speculation. 
Viewing this in light most favorable to the non-moving party the accrual did not begin until 2013 
when Appellant first learned he could possibiy receive a refund. 
APPELLANTS BRIEF WITH SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS Page8 
ISSUE 2- Knowing Appellant had filed a Motion to disqualify without cause under IRCP 40 
(d)(J) should dirtrict court Judge Huributt have issued an order of dismissal of the 
case seven (7) days after receiving tire Motion to disqualify without cause? 
The purpose of this rule is to assure a fair tribunal by allowing a party to disqualify a Judge 
thought to be unfair or biased. Jahnke v .. Moore 112 Idaho 944, 737 P2d 465 (Ct. App. !982). 
Knowing that Appeliant feels Judge Hurlbutt is unfair and biased. and had filed a Motion for 
Disqualification without Cause. he should not have filed any Order to the case. except to excuse himself. 
By ignoring plaintiffs motion to disqualify. then hastily granting the defense's motion to 
dismiss. prior to receiving plaintiff's response to said motion, the court proved to be unfair and biased 
(dkt 2). 
Furthermore. continuing to show bias and unfairness, t.1-ie district court denied plaintiffs motion to 
disqualify "WITHOUT CAUSE'. quoting Rule 40(d)(1 )(h), which states: 
·'a party moving to disquaftfj: a judge or magistrate under this rule 40 
(d)(J) shall mail a copy of the motionfi>r disquaf!ficaTion to the presiding 
judge or magistrate at the fudges resident chambers." 
Appellant's motion was filed with the clerk of the court as ali other motions are filed, it's clear it 
was received, it was responded to. In researching Rule 40( d)(] )(h) the clerk of ihe court claims that 
Judge Hurlbutt does not have a separate address for a resident chambers were motions can be mailed to. 
In the interest of Justice, Appellant did not need a cause for disqualification, yet, the district court 
provided one. Proving to be unfair and biased the district courts orders should be reversed and 
remanded. 
APPELLANTS BRIEF WITH SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS Page9 
ISSUE 3- Did the Diftrict Court abuse its discretion by granting Defendants/Respondents 
Motion to Dismiss prematurely without allowi11g Plaintiff/Appellant a chance to 
respond? 
Defendants/Respondents fiied a Motion (dki 30), with Memorandmn in support (dkt 32), to 
Dismiss according to iRCP Rule 12 (b)(6) or alternatively Rule 56 (c). using the 2006 revocation 
hearing as the accrual date for statute of limitations. 
The District Court failed to consider that Rule 12 (b )(6) goes on to state that 
··To dismiss for failure of the pleading 10 state a claim upon which 
relief can be granred, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and 
no/ excluded by the coun The motion shall he treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed C?l as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportuni(v to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion be Rule 56." 
f n violation of this Rule, Appellant was not given a reasonable opportunity to respond. or to 
present any evidence. The Motion was filed on the 11 th of October 2013 and the District Court, without 
waiting for Plaintiffs response, granted Defendants Motion to dismiss just four ( 4) days iater on J 5 
October 2013 ( dkt 40 ). 
With a Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment on the grounds of statute of limitations or 
lachas it would be better made only after the non-moving party has answered, and the issues are framed. 
Osterloh v. State 100 Idaho 702, 604 P2d 716 (I 979). 
Appeliant had planned to respond to the Motion to dismiss with affidavits supporting his 
responses. Yet the District Courts premature Order did not allow that. It must be deemed a biased 
Order when only considering one side of the argument, or refusing to aJlow a response from the non 
moving party. 
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ISSUE 4- ls the $600.00 collected from Appellant by the Re,5pondents an issue of material 
fact for which relief can be granted? 
While it has been determined that a parolee can be charged a cost of supervision fee. this is not a 
one-time fee. It occurs on a month to month basis. As a parolee, AppeHm1t successfully completed a 
number of months without incident. At the beginning of each of these months a fee was charged by the 
defendants to provide services which allowed l.ppeilant the ability to be on parole for that month. 
Yet. when Appellant was violated~ the parole commission exercised its ability to pull more than 
the parole time of just the month the violation occurred in. They used IC 20-228 to pull every month of 
Appellants parole time. 
Therefore. by their own discretion and choice. once the defendants later chose to pulJ a 
completed month of good time served on parole it must be deemed that they did not provide the services 
for the month. They must therefore return the collected money for successfuliy completed months they 
chose not to count but were completed without violation. If no violation occurred within the month not 
being counted and a new month began. Respondents shouid not be financially rewarded for voiding the 
contractual agreement at a later date. They should not be allowed to keep those funds from a completed 
month they voluntarily choose not to count? 
Although Appellant finds no case law either supporting or denying this claim (which is why 
counsel should be appointed in setting precedence) because the fee is charged each month, Appeilant 
claims that once a month is successfully completed. he has fulfilled his contractual obligation that 
month. As a new month begins, a new contract is invoked and a new fee charged. This continued 
month to month throughout the length of parole. 
A completed monthly contract is fulfilled when the final day passes and no violations have 
occurred, thereby, beginning a new monthly contract and new fee for services. If the commission 
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decides at a later date to pull a successfully completed month (where they cannot claim a violation 
occurred during that monthj then, they can oniy say they are choosing not to count the month thereby 
retracting any service that wac; paid for, and entitling Appellant to a refund. Appellant is demanding 
$600.00 for successful months completed and paid for which the commission chose to pull by also 
revoking any services allegedly rendered ( dkt 15 ). 
Defendants demanded that while on parole Appeilant attends outpatient treatment therapy and 
was charged a $50.00 per week fee for that therapy. By being charged this extra fee and being required 
to attend this mandated program, defendants overstepped the intent of Idaho Code 20-228 when 
choosing not to count this time. Since Appellant did what was required. paid all the fees and attended 
al] classes, it must be deemed he completed his end of those monthly contracts. It was the defendants 
who have not fulfi1led their end of those monthly contracts, and therefore, a return of Appellants service 
fees must be granted. 
According to contract law, when either party faiis to uphold their end of the contracL the contract 
itself can be deemed null and void. When Appellant was paroled he was required to sign a contract with 
the Parole Commission, it was a requirement. which was binding for all parties to adhere to. Appellant 
claims that parole supervision fees should be viewed as month to month contracts. It is clear that any 
violation during the month forfeits that month's fee as a revocation occurs and parole can be terminated. 
Likewise, when Respondents fail to count a successfuJly completed month they should forfeit their 
service fee. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is weil established that the statute of limitations begins when the plaintiff knows or shou]d 
have known about the issues_ In this ca-;e the Plaintiff/ Appellant did not know he could file for a refund 
of his parole fees. Nor should he have known_ To this day, Appellant has no knowledge of established 
case law on the issue. Respondents have failed to offer any proof that he had known, or should have 
known. Respondents instead rely on speculation that he should have known because his time was being 
forfeited. Speculation is not evidence. nor should it be accepted as such. Encouraged by Respondents to 
view all case law, information and inferences in his favor the Motion for Dismissal on statute of 
limitations should be denied. 
By Responding to Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss without cause, the district court admitted that it 
was aware of the bias challenge and should have excused itself from the case. The District Court erred 
by speedily ruling and Ordering the case be dismissed. This shows a willful and wanton act of bias. 
which is the purpose Rule 40 ( d ){ 1) intended to avoid. Also. when Plaintiff/ Appellant filed for Motion 
to Dismiss without cause. the Court denied the Motion using an improper claim that Appellant did not 
properly serve the courts private chambers. There is no address or information available for Plaintiff to 
serve a certificate of service to private chambers. as Rule 40 ( d)( 1 )(h) suggests. This caused 
Plaintifil Appellant his right to access the court for a fair and impartial ruling for his motion, playing a 
part in his case being dismissed. 
With the District Court having knowledge that all information and inferences should be deemed 
or looked at favorably toward the non moving party, the District Court error in rendering a judgment 
prior to receiving Appellants response to the Motion to Dismiss. By not allowing a response, the district 
court demonstrated prejudice and bias and is the exact reason for which Appellants Rule 40 (d)(I) 
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Motion to dismiss without cause was filed. Appellant bas a constitutional right of due process to 
respond and offer evidence in his own beP.alf. 
Whether the pleading would be successful or not is irrelevant in this matter. The fact is that 
Respondents collected $600.00 for services they did not provide. The refund is an issue of material fact 
on which relief if successful could be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED this day of January. 2014. 
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STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
(ss. 
County of Ada ) 
William I ,ightner, Appellant. after first being duiy sworn upon his oath deposes and says as 
follows: 
1. I am the Affiant in the above entitled matter. 
2. I am over the age of ! 8. of sound mind, and able to testify to these matters. 
3. I am currently residing at ICC. Unit P-218. P. 0. box 70010. Boise, ID 83707. 
4. I have been incarcerated since my 2006 parole revocation hearing (''hearing"). 
5. At my hearing. I was informed only that my parole was being terminated, and that all 
credited time was being forfeited and would be added to the end of my sentence. 
6. With my parole time being forfeited at that hearing, the commission voluntarily chose to 
cancel and void their monthly contractuai agreements and not count the months I paid them 
for services. Therefore, I claim the services I paid for were not rendered and I am entitled to 
a refund of the monthly fees for the months I successfully completed without violation. 
7. I was not told or informed that J was entitled to or could ask for a refund of the money 
defendants collected from me. 
8. During my entire time in prison. I have never spoken to anyone who has told me they 
received a refund of parole supervision fees. 
9. It is the Commission policy not to mention paid supervision fees at revocation hearings. 
10. By not crediting me the time for which I paid. the Commission did not provide the service for 
which the fee was collected. 
I I. I believe the $600.00 in question is a genuine issue of material fact that can be granted as 
relief. 
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12. While the Defendants have used my 2006 revocation hearing date. they have shown no proof 
or evidence to claim I knew or should have known of a possible refund at that time. 
I 3. I believe that the time forfeiture and cost of supervision reimbursement are two separate, 
distinct. and individual issues. 
14. The only mention that I made a'> the Plaintiff/ Appe1Jant in this case toward the number of 
days taken, was as an alternative to the reimbursement for settlement purposes. 
15. Like with all motions, my Rule 40 ( d )(I) motion to dismiss without cause \\'as properly filed 
with the clerk of the district court. 
16. While I was on parole I was required to take outpatient therapy through the SANE program 
which I attended each week. Being in therapy as a parole requirement and also being 
charged a treatment fee I feel that in not counting this time the defendants have violated my 
rights ,vhen not reimbursing me since they have chosen not to count the time. 
17. The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA VETH NAUGHT 
DATED this Jf- day of January, 2014. 
___ day January, 201 
~~~c 
Not~~ Public for \{laho ~ -,-.- (l I , 
Res1dmg at: V:)u~ ~Q. ~
My C~li~j.on Expires: 
··-tt.Af ••• • •l!C ••.••. ; .. Oo_•• 
:91.~"+o-r,4 _: .. ,i• .. . ,...., ~' . . ....,, -\ . 
• ...;J, •.Jt• 
• I f"".'11. 
• I t,lllli". 
• ra'. ~ l!J:!• ·. -~-- .. -.... j· • 'f'Jia.:, .... ,f 
• ~<t'. ~---~-·· • •• Op •• 
•• •• 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
(ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Marcia Lightner. after first being duly sworn upon her oath deposes and says as follows: 
I. I am an Affiant to this above entitled matter. 
2. I am over the age of 18, of sound mind, and able to testify to these matters. 
3. I am currently residing at PO Box 574 Ontario. OR 97914. 
4. I attended the 2006 parole revocation hearing of William Lightner #41438. 
5. At no time during this hearing, did I hear the parole commission ever mention to William 
Lightner about reimbursement money which defendants collected they received for parole 
. . f. superviston iees. 
6. At no time during this 2006 revocation hearing, did I hear the parole commissioners ever 
mention to William Lightner that his service fees were being taken, or that he was entitled to 
a refund. 
7. At no time during this 2006 revocation hearing, did I hear the commission mention to Mr. 
Lightner informing him that he was entitled to or could ask for a refund of the money 
defendants collected from him. 
8. [n reviewing parole commission hearing minuets no statements reflect any information given 
to Mr. Lightner informing him about a refund for collected supervision fees when his parole 
time was forfeited. 
9. The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. 
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FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA vdn NA UGI 
DATED this 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / J dav of Januarv, 201 
. d~ttL- q;_ ~~4 ... ... , 
.•;i~~~9 .. o~)lot~~ Public for IdaR? _\ ·- .1 . J? / " 
_.-,.,,,-, oT ..... ~,dmg at: . _, u~J-e,~ ~ c:t-N.J 
:}9/ ~ _,. ~ommission Expires: ';-- d 1~ I 
.~, f • 
:<:a: ' • • .-\ I I . . , .
•'~'*' ,. ....... ~~ ..... •-A•,. I'! ,.. 
• 'if'th'-···· •• 
•.;.rs or •• •••••••• 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this /7 day of January 2014. I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
APPELLANTS BREIF WITH SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS OF WILLIAM AND MARCIA 
LIGHTNER via the US mail system to: 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CIVIL DIVISION, APPELL.\ TE UNIT 
PO BOX 87320 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
KARIN MAGNELLI ISB 8929 
Deputy Attorney General 
APPELLANTS BRIEF WITH SUPPORTING AFFIDAVrTS Page 18 
